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7	NOT FOR CITATION	
8	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
9	FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
10	SAN JOSE DIVISION	
11	QUIA CORPORATION,	No. C10-01902 JF (HRL)
12	Plaintiff, v.	CONDITIONAL ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
13	v.	PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL DEPOSITION TESTIMONY
14	MATTEL, INC. and FISHER-PRICE, INC.,	[Re: Docket No. 112]
15	Defendants.	[Ref. Bocket 100 112]
16		
17	Plaintiff moves to compel deposition testimony concerning the "iXL" trademark	

applications filed by defendant Mattel, Inc. (Mattel). Defendants oppose the motion. The matter was deemed submitted on the papers without oral argument. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). Upon consideration of the moving and responding papers, this court conditionally grants the motion in part and denies it in part as follows:

Discovery as to the "iXL" trademark applications is relevant or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). Inasmuch as defendants used the word "adopt" in prior briefing to refer to (among other things) the subject trademark applications, this court finds that plaintiff's original Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) deposition notices provided sufficient notice of the subjects of examination. The court therefore does not reach the issue whether plaintiff's amended deposition notices were timely served. Plaintiff has not, however, convincingly demonstrated that defendants waived the attorney-client privilege as to

the subject matter of the trademark applications.

This court is told that defendant Fisher-Price, Inc. (Fisher-Price) was not involved with the trademark applications at issue. And, although the discovery motion is styled as one to compel testimony from both defendants, the motion itself focuses on Mattel.

Accordingly, plaintiff's motion is denied as to Fisher-Price. But, Mattel should have prepared a designee to testify about the trademark applications. Any opportunity to further depose Mattel about those applications, however, is conditioned on the presiding judge's determination that the present case schedule should be modified to allow additional time for plaintiff to depose defendant Mattel as to those applications. In that vein, this court reports that even with the extension to May 18, 2011 to complete certain depositions, the instant motion to compel was not timely filed, albeit only by one day. Civ. L.R. 37-3.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 12, 2011

HCWARD R. LOYS UNITED STAILS MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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1	5:10-cv-01902-JF Notice has been electronically mailed to:	
2	Bobby A. Ghajar bobby.ghajar@pillsburylaw.com, grady.johnson@pillsburylaw.com	
3	Kelly Wong Craven kelly.craven@pillsburylaw.com	
4	Mark J. Nagle mnagle@murphyrosen.com	
5	Peter Edward Moll, Esq Peter.Moll@cwt.com, Matthew.Penfield@cwt.com	
6	Robert L. Meylan rmeylan@murphyrosen.com, mtapia@murphyrosen.com	
7	Shaunt Toros Arevian sarevian@murphyrosen.com, hcrawford@murphyrosen.com	
8	Shaw Pittman Shaw.Pittman@cwt.com	
9	Steven Marc Weinberg smweinberg@holmesweinberg.com, hwtrademarks@gmail.com	
10	registered for e-filing under the court's CM/ECF program.	
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